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INTRODUCTION 
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court of the United States 
(“Supreme Court”) has granted certiorari to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) in six cases.  
While this level of review is not atypical, what is striking, however, is 
                                                          
 * Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
 ** Law clerk to Judge Gajarsa, 2005-2006. 
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the fact that four of these cases have involved patent law.  This is the 
same number of patent cases taken on certiorari during the first 
twelve years of the Federal Circuit’s existence.  Is this truly a recent 
upswing or a statistical aberration?  And if the latter is true, why is it 
occurring, will the trend continue, and what are the implications for 
the development of patent law?  We pose these questions because 
they deserve reflection as we all ponder the trajectory of what is, after 
all, a relatively young court.  That said, we do not profess to have the 
answers, and even if we did, there would be little hope of relaying 
them in a short piece such as this.  Rather, our goal is to encourage 
you to think about the evolving relationship between the Federal 
Circuit, the regional circuits, and the Supreme Court. 
Let me start by reciting the facts.  Since the inception of the 
Federal Circuit in 1982, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
it a total of fifty-two times.1  Of these, sixteen cases (almost a third) 
have involved issues of patent law.2  As we discuss below, the Supreme 
Court’s involvement in reviewing this court’s patent law judgments 
began in 1988, when it granted certiorari in Christianson v. Colt 
Industries Operating Corp.3 More recently, in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court started its foray into the real 
“essentials” of patent law.5 
Indeed, Markman appears to represent a turning point in the 
history of the Supreme Court’s review of Federal Circuit patent cases.  
Markman was decided in 1996, during the Court’s October 1995 term, 
which was the thirteenth term since the creation of the Federal 
Circuit.  In the twelve terms preceding Markman, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 1. Here, we are not including summary dispositions, writs of certiorari that were 
granted and later withdrawn, or decisions summarily vacated in light of an earlier 
Supreme Court decision.  For example, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), the 
Court vacated a number of Federal Circuit judgments. 
We also exclude Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986), 
in which the Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded to us for a better 
explanation of how we conducted our review of a district court’s obviousness 
determination in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).  Id. at 811.  In 
Panduit, the Supreme Court held that “[i]n the absence of an opinion clearly setting 
forth the views of the Court of Appeals on these matters, we are not prepared to give 
plenary consideration to petitioner’s claim that the decision below cannot be 
squared with Rule 52(a).”  Id.  Following our decision on remand, the Court 
declined to grant certiorari. 
 2. We have included in this count cases involving the Plant Variety Protection 
Act, given that the Act provides protection similar in form to that given by patents, 
even though technically the case does not involve any “patent.” 
 3. (Christianson II), 822 F.2d 1544, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 4. 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (unanimously affirming the Federal Circuit’s judgment 
that the construction of a patent is exclusively within the province of the court, not 
the jury), aff’g 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 5. Id. at 372, aff’g 52 F.3d at 987, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336. 
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had heard only four patent cases.6  In the ten terms that have 
followed, however, it has heard almost three times as many.7  Of 
these, four cases—more than a third—were heard in its last two terms 
alone.8  It is notable, moreover, that the total number of this Circuit’s 
cases that have undergone review has remained roughly constant 
over the years, with pre- and post-Markman numbers of twenty-four 
and twenty-seven, respectively.  It appears as if the Supreme Court is 
indeed showing an increased interest in our patent law jurisprudence 
specifically, as opposed to our cases more generally.9 
This Article consists of two parts.  In Part I, we discuss Christianson, 
the case that appears to have kick-started Supreme Court review of 
our patent cases.  We then outline, in chronological order, the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent major patent law decisions through the 
October, 2003 Term, focusing on Markman as a turning point in the 
frequency of review.  Then, we briefly examine all of the cases from 
our court, both patent and non-patent, that the Supreme Court has 
heard during its 2004 and 2005 terms.  In Part II, we offer some 
thoughts on the future of Supreme Court review of the Federal 
Circuit. 
                                                          
 6. See Part I.A infra (discussing the Supreme Court’s involvement in Christianson, 
the first patent law case that the Court had heard since the creation of the Federal 
Circuit). 
 7. See Part I.C infra (discussing Supreme Court patent law decisions in the wake 
of Markman). 
 8. See Part II infra (discussing the increase in the Supreme Court’s review of 
Federal Circuit patent law decisions). 
 9. Consider, as a point of reference, the conclusion of two commentators in 
1992, who had studied Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit decisions in the first 
ten years of its existence: 
The Court, in its consideration of Federal Circuit substantive law, appears 
less willing to address substantive patent law than the other areas of Federal 
Circuit substantive law . . . .  The Court has addressed many cases raising 
issues of substantive merit systems protection, tax and claims law; however, it 
has only addressed one case raising an issue of substantive patent law. 
Mark J. Abate & Edmund J. Fish, Supreme Court Review of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1982-1992, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 307, 333 (1992).  The authors 
characterized the Court’s deference on patent law issues as “not surprising,” given 
that the goal of the Federal Circuit was to “foster uniformity in patent law.”  Id.  They 
concluded by posing the following salient question:  “Whether the Court will 
continue to show deference to Federal Circuit substantive patent law and begin to 
show deference to other areas of Federal Circuit substantive law . . . [?]”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
A. Christianson v. Colt:  The Federal Circuit’s Virtual  Invitation to the 
Supreme Court 
In 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Christianson v. 
Colt Industries Operating Corp.,10 thereby hearing its first patent case 
since the creation of the Federal Circuit six years earlier.11  In that 
case, Christianson had brought an antitrust suit against Colt, and 
issues of patent law were implicated only by part of Colt’s defense 
against those charges.12  The issue was whether the Federal Circuit or 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (“Seventh 
Circuit”) had jurisdiction over the appeal.13 
The Seventh Circuit rejected jurisdiction, based in large part on its 
expansive view of the relevant Federal Circuit jurisdictional statutes.14  
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit believed that it should interpret the 
statutes as consolidating patent law appeals in a single, nationwide 
court, because this would effectuate Congress’s goal of achieving 
uniformity in the patent law.15  Receiving the case on transfer from 
the Seventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit was candid about the need 
for clarification of the scope of its patent law jurisdiction.16  However, 
it “[found] no basis or rationale . . . for an expanded, open-ended 
view that this court has been granted jurisdiction over all appeals in 
cases that contain patent issues.”17  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that 
                                                          
 10. (Christianson III), 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Christianson II, 822 F.2d 1544, 1159, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1252 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (stating that this antitrust action “arose under the patent laws” because of 
the defendant’s use of a trade secret defense). 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) vests the district courts with “original jurisdiction of any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”  In turn, 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) vests the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over appeals where 
“jurisdiction of [the district] court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of 
this title . . . .”  Absent a grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit, only 
the regional circuit may hear the case. 
 14. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. (Christianson I), 798 F.2d 
1051, 1056-57, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 840, 845 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 15. See id. at 1058, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 846 (“The primary purposes for the 
creation of the Federal Circuit were to provide greater uniformity in the substantive 
law of patents and to prevent the inevitable forum shopping that results from 
conflicting patent decisions in the regional circuits.  It is these concerns that animate 
the jurisdictional grant under § 1295 and inform our analysis of the jurisdiction 
question.” (citing Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 223 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc)). 
 16. See Christianson II, 822 F.2d at 1550, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245 (“With five 
years of experience under the Act, it may be time for Congress to make its intention 
even more clear to those willing to look for it in the statute and legislative history.  In 
the meantime, clarity may be advanced by vigorous, straightforward, and complete 
expression of views by all concerned.”). 
 17. Id. at 1553, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.  Indeed, it stated that “Congress was 
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it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Nevertheless, it decided 
to hear the case on the grounds of necessity.18  It reasoned as follows: 
If this court were to grant Christianson’s motion to dismiss, the 
district court’s judgment, though it is erroneous, infra, would stand, 
unless the Supreme Court were to grant a petition for certiorari, review the 
jurisdiction question, and remand to the appropriate appellate 
court for its review on the merits. A dismissal of this appeal would 
therefore risk leaving the parties with no avenue of appellate 
review . . . .19 
In what may have helped to spur Supreme Court intervention, the 
Federal Circuit then openly presumed the Court’s non-interest and 
consequently decided to reach the merits of a case over which it 
admittedly lacked subject matter jurisdiction.20  Specifically, the panel 
declined to engage in what it perceived to be the futile exercise of 
certifying the question for review.  It also expressed a desire not to 
burden the Supreme Court with the issue: 
Because the Seventh Circuit and this court have each determined 
that the other has jurisdiction, it would at first appear that 
certification to the Supreme Court would be warranted, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3).  Much as we might welcome a definitive 
resolution of the present jurisdiction question, we equally abhor the 
burden on the Court, noting that it has accepted only four certified 
questions since 1946.  The relative rarity of the present issue and 
the added delay to the litigants argue against this court’s adding to 
the already heavy workload of the Supreme Court by certification.21 
                                                                                                                                      
not concerned that an occasional patent law decision of a regional circuit court, or of 
a state court, would defeat its goal of increased uniformity in the national law of 
patents.”  Id. at 1552, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (citing Atari, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 
223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074); cf. infra text accompanying notes 79-80 (discussing a 
recent case in which the Federal Circuit expressed its concern about the regional 
circuits developing their own patent law). 
 18. See Christianson II, 822 F.2d at 1560, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253 (“[W]e . . . 
deny Colt’s request that, if this court lacks jurisdiction, we re-re-transfer the appeal to 
the Seventh Circuit.”). 
 19. Id., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. at 1559, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252. 
 21. Id., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252-53 (emphasis added) (citing R. STERN, E. 
GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 460-61 & n.3 (6th ed. 1986)).  
Indeed, as expressed elsewhere by one member of this court in 1990: 
The impetus behind the establishment of the Federal Circuit was the desire 
to bring about greater uniformity and coherency in federal decisional law in 
the areas assigned to the court.  A complementary objective was to relieve 
some of the pressure on the Supreme Court caused by the need to monitor 
intercircuit differences in these areas. 
S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the Non-regional 
Subject Matter Concept:  Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 854-
855 (1990). 
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Even notwithstanding whatever spurring effect the above-quoted 
language may have had, the Supreme Court’s interest in Christianson 
was unsurprising, as the case was an ideal candidate for review.  Not 
only did it involve fundamental issues of subject matter jurisdiction, 
but it also involved a direct conflict between the Federal Circuit and a 
regional circuit.  Indeed, the Supreme Court characterized the state 
of affairs as “a peculiar jurisdictional battle between the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit [where] . . . [e]ach has transferred the case to the 
other . . . [a]nd each insists that the other’s jurisdictional decision is 
‘clearly wrong.’”22  The parties, noted the Court, were condemned to 
“shuttle their appeal back and forth” between the Circuits in search 
of relief.23 
The outcome in Christianson was that the Supreme Court agreed 
with the Federal Circuit that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  In 
so doing, the Court confirmed that the standards of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, traditionally applied to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, should be 
adopted for use in the § 1338 context.24  Consequently, it held that a 
case “arises under” the patent laws for jurisdictional purposes only 
where “‘federal patent law [either] creates the cause of action 
or . . . the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution 
of a  substantial question of federal patent law.’”25  The Court held 
that the Federal Circuit had erred in reaching the merits of a case in 
which jurisdiction was absent.26 
                                                          
 22. Christianson III, 486 U.S. 800, 803 (1988). 
 23. Id. at 804. 
 24. Id. at 809. However, in the subsequent case of Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine 
Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., the Federal Circuit held that the well-pleaded 
complaint rule was not meant to be rigidly applied.  895 F.2d 736, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1670  (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).  This liberal interpretation of the well-
pleaded complaint rule continued, with the Federal Circuit assuming jurisdiction in 
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., over an appeal in which the 
only patent issues had been raised in counterclaims.  13 F.App’x 961 (Fed. Cir. 
2001).  The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s order, holding that the case 
fell outside the limits of the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.  See Holmes 
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832-33 (2002) (stating 
that § 1295(a)(1) and § 1338(a) do not confer “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” to 
the Federal Circuit whenever a patent-law counterclaim arises); see also infra notes 73-
80 and accompanying text. 
 25. Christianson III, 486 U.S. at 808 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)). 
 26. See id. at 818 (“Our agreement with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that it 
lacked jurisdiction compels us to disapprove of its decision to reach the merits 
anyway ‘in the interest of justice.’”). 
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B. From Christianson through Markman 
During this period, from 1989 through 1996, the Supreme Court 
heard an additional four Federal Circuit patent cases, ending with 
Markman.27 
In 1990, the Court decided Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,28 where 
it affirmed the Federal Circuit’s construction of ambiguous language 
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).29  That section rendered noninfringing the 
testing and marketing of “a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, 
use, or sale of drugs. . .”30  The issue was whether the safe harbor 
provision could apply to a non-drug invention if the “Federal law” 
contained (1) some provisions that “relate[d] to the development 
and submission of information” regarding the non-drug invention 
and (2) other provisions that “regulate[] the manufacture, use, or 
sale of drugs.”31  The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit 
that § 271(e)(1) could apply.  Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court 
would revisit § 271(e)(1), in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,32 
which is discussed below. 
In 1993, in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International,33 the 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and held 
that where we affirm a judgment of non-infringement, we retain 
jurisdiction to review district courts’ declaratory judgments on patent 
invalidity vel non.34  Moreover, it held that we cannot routinely refuse, 
as a matter of policy, to exercise this jurisdiction.35  In 1995, the 
Supreme Court decided Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,36 once again 
reversing the Federal Circuit and construing an ambiguous provision 
of the Plant Variety Protection Act to limit the sale of protected seed 
for reproductive purposes to what farmers would have needed to use 
to replant their own acreage.37  Then in 1996, the Court decided 
                                                          
 27. See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text (discussing cases). 
 28. 496 U.S. 661 (1990), aff’g 872 F.2d 402, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). 
 29. Id. at 661-62. 
 30. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1) (2000)). 
 31. Id. (emphasis added). 
 32. 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2384 (2005); see infra text accompanying notes 121-129. 
 33. 508 U.S. 83 (1993), vacating 959 F.2d 948, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
 34. Id. at 83-85. 
 35. Id. at 97. 
 36. 513 U.S. 179 (1995), rev’g 982 F.2d 486, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1202 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 37. Id. at 190-91. 
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Markman, in which it affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit 
and held that claim construction was a matter for the court and not 
for the jury.38  Taking the matter from the jury, moreover, did not 
violate the Seventh Amendment.39 
At around the time of Markman, the Supreme Court appears to 
have begun to review Federal Circuit patent cases with increasing 
frequency, hearing almost three times as many patent cases after 
Markman than before.40  The following section outlines this period of 
increasing Supreme Court interest in our patent law jurisprudence, 
including the Supreme Court’s increasing involvement with the 
“mechanics” of the patent law. 
C. Post-Markman, through the Supreme Court’s 2003 Term 
In the years that followed Markman, the Supreme Court became 
increasingly engaged in the “nuts and bolts” of Title 35.  Moreover, its 
involvement in one case often gave rise to its later involvement in 
another.  For example, the Court’s decision in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.41 led to its involvement in Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.42  We discuss both of these cases 
below. 
In Warner-Jenkinson, decided in 1997, the Supreme Court tackled 
the issue of how and when claim amendments made during 
prosecution can give rise to prosecution history estoppel in the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents.43  In explaining its interest 
in the case, the Supreme Court noted “significant disagreement” 
within the Federal Circuit regarding the proper application of the 
doctrine of equivalents,44 which the Supreme Court had last visited in 
1950 in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.45 
Reversing the Federal Circuit, the Warner-Jenkinson Court held that 
the addition of a claim limitation during patent prosecution did not 
                                                          
 38. 517 U.S. 370 (1996), aff’g 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 39. Id. at 384. 
 40. Compare cases cited in Part I.A-B supra (excluding Markman), with cases cited 
in Part I.C infra. 
 41. 520 U.S. 17 (1997), rev’g 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 42. 535 U.S. 722 (2002), rev’g 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (en banc). 
 43. See generally Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) 
(holding that the doctrine of equivalents is not inconsistent with Congress’s 1952 
revision of the Patent Act and is therefore still applicable). 
 44. Id. at 21; see also infra note 159 (discussing the need for consistency in the 
application of judicial doctrines in order to promote uniformity and avoid 
confusion). 
 45. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
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necessarily preclude application of the doctrine of equivalents.46  
However, such an amendment, made for an unknown reason, would 
give rise to a presumption that the amendment was made for a 
“substantial reason related to patentability.”47  It also held that the 
determination of equivalence is an objective inquiry that is to be 
determined on an element by element basis,48 although there is some 
flexibility in the particular linguistic framework that is used.49 
The Supreme Court remanded Warner-Jenkinson to us for further 
proceedings consistent with its opinion.  It also remanded three 
additional cases in view of Warner-Jenkinson.  One of those cases was 
Festo Corp. v. SMC Corp.50  After we heard the remanded Festo case en 
banc, the Supreme Court then granted certiorari.51  Festo is described 
below in greater detail.52 
In 1998, the Supreme Court decided Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,53 
where it once again dealt with the essentials of patent law, here an 
interpretation of the on-sale bar.54  The Court explained that it was 
granting certiorari in part because of a split between the Federal 
Circuit and the regional circuits.55  (As an aside, this regional circuit 
law happened to pre-date the creation of the Federal Circuit.)  The 
Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit, holding that in 
order for the sale (or an offer of sale) of an invention to trigger the 
on-sale patentability bar, the invention needs either to be reduced to 
practice or described with enabling specificity.56 
                                                          
 46. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40-41. 
 47. Id. at 33 (“[I]f the patent-holder demonstrates that an amendment required 
during prosecution had a purpose unrelated to patentability, a court must consider 
that purpose in  order to decide whether an estoppel is precluded. Where the patent-
holder is unable to establish such a purpose, a court should presume that the 
purpose behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel 
would apply.”). 
 48. Id. at 40. 
 49. Id. at 39-40. 
 50. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp., 520 U.S. 1111 (1997).  
The other two cases were Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Systems, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997), and 
United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. 1183 (1997). 
 51. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001). 
 52. See infra text accompanying notes 83-93. 
 53. 525 U.S. 55 (1998), aff’g 124 F.3d 1429, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1928 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 54. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (on-sale bar). 
 55. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 60 (citing Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 
299-302 (2d Cir. 1975); Dart Indus., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 
1359, 1365 n.11, 585 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 392, 397 n.11 (7th Cir. 1973)) (granting 
certiorari because of a conflict with the regional circuits’ pre-Federal Circuit case 
law). 
 56. Id. at 67-69. 
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In 1999, in Dickinson v. Zurko,57 the Supreme Court reversed an en 
banc decision of the Federal Circuit, which had held that the 
standards of the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to its 
review of Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) decisions.58  The 
Supreme Court noted that there had been considerable controversy 
about the issue within the Federal Circuit, as well as between the 
Federal Circuit and the Commissioner of the PTO, and that the 
Federal Circuit had decided to hear the case en banc “hoping 
definitively to resolve” the controversy.59 
Decided at almost the same time as Zurko was Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank.60  While 
Florida Prepaid, like Zurko, did not address the “essentials” of the 
patent law, it did address the fundamentals of state sovereign 
immunity and states’ vulnerability to suit for the infringement of 
intellectual property rights.61  The Court reversed the Federal Circuit, 
holding that because the involved patent statute was not passed 
pursuant to the remedial powers clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the legislation had not abrogated the state’s sovereign 
immunity from suit.62 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned that Congress 
could not abrogate state sovereign immunity unless state 
infringement remedies were inadequate to protect patentees, who 
would therefore suffer a deprivation of property without due process 
of law.63  The Court observed, that “Congress, however, barely 
considered the availability of state remedies . . . .”64 
The majority in Florida Prepaid noted that “[t]he need for 
uniformity in the construction of patent law is undoubtedly 
important,” but considered it to be an irrelevant “factor which 
belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus, rather than to any 
determination of whether a state plea of sovereign immunity deprives 
a patentee of property without due process of law.”65  The dissent 
vigorously disagreed, characterizing the “Article I patent-power 
                                                          
 57. 527 U.S. 150 (1999), rev’g 142 F.3d 1447, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 58. Id. at 153. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 527 U.S. 627 (1999), rev’g 148 F.3d 1343, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 61. Id. at 627-28. 
 62. Id. at 647. 
 63. See id. at 643 (“[O]nly where the State provides no remedy, or only 
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent 
could a deprivation of property without due process result.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 645. 
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calculus” as “directly relevant to this case because it establishes the 
constitutionality of the congressional decision to vest exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent infringement cases in the federal 
courts[,] . . . [a] decision [that] was unquestionably appropriate.”66  
The dissent reasoned that “it was equally appropriate for Congress to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases in 
order to close a potential loophole in the uniform federal 
scheme . . . .”67  Of course, when patentees seek remedies in the state 
courts, rather than in the federal district courts, we do not have 
jurisdiction over their appeals.  Therefore, the Supreme Court would 
bear the direct burden of policing the consistency of state courts’ 
application of the patent laws. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to review the 
scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with regard to whether or not 
plant life is patentable under the Patent Act.  In J.E.M. AG Supply v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International,68 the central issue was whether Congress, 
in passing the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act 
was providing an exclusive means of plant protection.69  Affirming the 
judgment of the Federal Circuit, the Court held that developed plant 
breeds were still covered by section 101.70  This conclusion, stated the 
Court, was consistent with its 1980 decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty,71 in which it had broadly interpreted section 101.72 
In Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,73 the 
Supreme Court vacated an order issued by the Federal Circuit in a 
case where the patent law issues appeared only in counterclaims.74  In 
so doing, the Court applied the well-pleaded complaint rule, as 
articulated in Christianson v. Colt Operating Industries75 to deny Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction based solely on patent law counterclaims.76  It 
                                                          
 66. Id. at 652 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 534 U.S. 124 (2001), aff’g 200 F.3d 1374, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (involving the infringement of rights granted pursuant to the Patent and 
Plant Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 
(1992)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 127. 
 71. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 72. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. at 131 (“[I]n approaching the question 
presented by this case, we are mindful that this Court has already spoken clearly 
concerning the broad scope and applicability of § 101.” (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303)). 
 73. 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
 74. Id at 834. 
 75. 486 U.S. 800 (1988); see supra Part I.A. 
 76. Vornado, 535 U.S. at 831.  The Court acknowledged that Christianson III had 
not directly decided the issue, as that case had dealt with jurisdiction based on patent 
law defenses, rather than counterclaims.  Id. at 830-31. 
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opined that it “declined to transform the longstanding well-pleaded-
complaint rule into the ‘well-pleaded-complaint-or-counterclaim 
rule’ . . . .”77  Concurring, Justice Stevens commented on the potential 
benefits of having the regional circuits decide some patent cases, 
thereby competing with the Federal Circuit in its development of the 
patent law: 
But we have already decided that the Federal Circuit does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases raising patent issues.  
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 811-812.  Necessarily, therefore, other 
circuits will have some role to play in the development of this area 
of the law.  An occasional conflict in decisions may be useful in 
identifying questions that merit this Court’s attention.  Moreover, 
occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide 
an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop an 
institutional bias.78 
The Court in Vornado, however, did not decide whether or not the 
regional circuits should apply Federal Circuit law when they hear 
patent cases.79  Some commentators have expressed concern that if 
the regional circuits do not defer to the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of the patent laws, then this will jeopardize the 
nationwide uniformity that Congress sought to achieve in creating 
the Federal Circuit.80  Additionally, in a footnote to Unitherm Food 
Systems v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,81 the Federal Circuit offered the following 
assessment in an antitrust case that included patent law 
counterclaims: 
[A]ntitrust claims met with counterclaims of infringement may not 
come before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.  If the resolution of the dispute rests, in part, upon a 
determination of whether or not a patentee’s behavior stripped it 
of its antitrust exemption, the appellate court hearing the matter 
will have to decide whether to apply Federal Circuit law or risk 
disturbing Congress’s goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity, by 
applying its own law.82 
                                                          
 77. Id. at 832. 
 78. Id. at 838-39 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 79. See Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty:  Preserving Uniformity 
in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 572 
(2004) (arguing that while “Vornado did not, . . . resolve the second question—what 
law [the regional circuits] should apply to patent claims” the rule of no deference 
potentially does). 
 80. See, e.g., id. at 569 (articulating that lack of deference to the Federal Circuit 
could lead to intercircuit conflicts and forum shopping). 
 81. 375 F.3d 1341, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d on other 
grounds, 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 1355-56 n.3, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724 n.3. 
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In 2002, the Supreme Court decided Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,83 again delving into the issue of the appropriate 
scope of prosecution history estoppel.  This time it had to deal with 
uncertainties created by its Warner-Jenkinson decision,84 namely 
regarding what kinds of amendments could give rise to prosecution 
history estoppel,85 and if there was estoppel, whether it completely, or 
only partially, barred the application of the doctrine of equivalents.86  
Hearing Festo en banc in 2000, the Federal Circuit had held (1) that 
any kind of narrowing amendment related to patentability, and not 
just those made to overcome prior art, could serve as a bar87 and 
(2) that such a bar was complete, thus altogether preventing the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents to that element.88  The 
Supreme Court affirmed on the first holding.89  The Court, however, 
noted the considerable dissent amongst the Federal Circuit judges on 
the second holding.90  It also noted that the Federal Circuit was 
making a break from its own prior case law.91  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
 83. 535 U.S. 722 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 84. Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997); see 
supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text (discussing the application of a flexible-bar 
rule). 
 85. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 17 (holding that “if the patent-holder 
demonstrates that an amendment required during prosecution had a purpose 
unrelated to patentability, a court must consider that purpose in order to decide 
whether an estoppel is precluded”). 
 86. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 738 (Ginsberg, J. and Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]e 
have consistently applied the doctrine in a flexible way, not a rigid one.  We have 
considered what equivalents were surrendered during the prosecution of the patent, 
rather than imposing a complete bar that resorts to the very literalism the equivalents 
rule is designed to overcome.”). 
The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson, which instructed 
that courts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled 
expectations of the inventing community.  See id. at 737-40 (stating that Warner-
Jenkinson did not provide a basis for the Court of Appeals’ adoption of a complete 
bar rule). 
 87. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 88. See id. at 569, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (“When a claim amendment 
creates prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no range 
of equivalents available for the amended claim element.  Application of the doctrine 
of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred (a ‘complete bar’).”).  
Similarly, the Federal Circuit held that when no explanation for a claim amendment 
is established, thereby giving rise to the Warner-Jenkinson presumption of prosecution 
history estoppel “no range of equivalents is available for the claim element so 
amended.”  Id. at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 89. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 736 (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that a 
narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give 
rise to an estoppel.”). 
 90. Id. at 723. 
 91. Id. at 730 ( 
[C]ontroversial in the Court of Appeals was its . . . holding [that w]hen 
estoppel applies, it stands as a complete bar against any claim of equivalence 
GAJARSA.OFFTOPRINTER 5/20/2006  1:23:14 PM 
834 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:821 
therefore vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit, and imposed a 
flexible-bar rule.92  The Court explained that just because an inventor 
amends an application, and thereby constructively “concede[s] that 
the patent does not extend as far as the original claim[, i]t does not 
follow . . . that the amended claim becomes so perfect in its 
description that no one could devise an equivalent.”93 
D. Review of the Supreme Court’s October 2004 and 2005 Terms:   
All Federal Circuit Cases 
As we mentioned in the introduction, in the last two years alone, 
we have seen the Supreme Court hear a total of six of our cases, four 
of which were patent-related.  We wish to describe those cases here, 
in varying levels of detail.  We start with the non-patent cases, as in 
number, if not also in importance, they dominate the Federal Circuit 
docket.94  We then discuss two patent cases that the Supreme Court 
has recently decided,95 and conclude with another two that the Court 
recently heard but has not yet decided as of this writing.96 
1. Recent non-patent cases from the Federal Circuit:  Indian rights and 
motions practice 
The majority of the Federal Circuit’s docket is not patent-related.  
Moreover, as we mentioned above, the total number of cases from 
this Circuit in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari has 
remained relatively constant over the years.97  While in this Article we 
have focused on tracing the history of, and outlining a possible trend 
in, the Supreme Court’s review of our patent cases, we do not wish to 
                                                                                                                                      
for the element that was amended.  The court acknowledged that its own 
prior case law did not go so far.  Previous decisions had held that 
prosecution history estoppel constituted a flexible bar . . . [t]he court 
concluded, however, that the . . . flexible-bar rule should be overruled 
because this case-by-case approach has proved unworkable. 
). 
 92. See id. at 737 (indicating that flexibility provided the proper balance for the 
needs of the patentee). 
 93. Id. at 738.  More specifically, the Court created three exceptions: 
There is no reason why a narrowing amendment should be deemed to 
relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment . . . [or] 
that have only a peripheral relation to the reason the amendment was 
submitted . . . or there may be some other reason suggesting that the 
patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the 
insubstantial substitute in question. 
Id. at 738-41. 
 94. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 95. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 96. See infra Part I.D.3. 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 1 (indicating that the Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari over a mere fifty-two Federal Circuit cases since 1982). 
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ignore the enduring consistency with which the rest of our docket has 
been reviewed on certiorari.  Here, to illustrate the breadth of issues 
that the Supreme Court hears on certiorari to our court, we briefly 
discuss the Supreme Court’s decisions in its last two non-patent cases 
from our court. 
a. Indian rights 
In Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt,98 the Supreme Court 
resolved a split between the Federal Circuit and the Tenth Circuit99 
on the extent of the federal government’s responsibility to honor 
contracts with Native American Nations, entered into pursuant to the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.100  In 
Thompson v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,101 the Federal Circuit had 
held the federal government accountable for its contractual 
obligations,102 but in a related case, the Tenth Circuit had held 
otherwise.103  The Supreme Court unanimously104 affirmed our 
judgment in Cherokee Nation, reversing the contrary decision of the 
Tenth Circuit and holding that the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services had breached its contract with Cherokee Nation.105 
The facts were as follows.  Pursuant to the Indian Self-
Determination Amendments of 1988,106 Cherokee Nation had 
entered into a contract with the government, wherein the 
government had promised to fund, and the Nation had promised to 
                                                          
 98. 543 U.S. 631 (2005). 
 99. In fact, the Supreme Court granted certiorari “[i]n light of the identical 
nature of the claims in the two cases and the opposite results that the two Courts of 
Appeals have reached . . . .”  Id. at 636. 
 100. This case came to us as an appeal from the Department of Interior, Board of 
Contract Appeals.  We had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10) (2000), 
which grants jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of an agency board of 
contract appeals pursuant to section 8(g)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 
1978 . . . .”  In contrast, the related action was brought in district court pursuant to 
25 U.S.C. § 450m-1(a) (2000), which authorizes district courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over civil actions brought under the Indian Self-Determination Act and to order 
appropriate relief.  See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 2d 
1248, 1254 (E.D. Okla. 2001). 
 101. 334 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 102. See id. at 1079 (concluding that since there were available appropriations, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services had a statutory obligation to make the 
payments). 
 103. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 1054, 1064-65 (10th Cir. 
2002) (holding that insufficient congressional appropriations did not amount to a 
contractual breach). 
 104. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 647 (2005) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., did not participate). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 
Stat. 2285 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988)). 
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supply, various services, namely tribal health services.107  These were 
services that the government would have otherwise both funded and 
supplied; and the purpose of the Act was to foster Indian self-
determination through the tribal administration of federally funded 
programs.108  As with other contracts entered into pursuant to the Act, 
Cherokee Nation’s contract contained government promises to pay 
not only for the direct costs of the program, but also for the indirect 
costs, such as administrative expenses and other “contract support 
costs.”109  The government, however, failed to provide funding for 
these indirect costs.110 
In its defense, the government advanced several arguments, each 
of which the Supreme Court found to be unconvincing.  The Court 
rejected, for example, its argument that government contracts made 
with Indian Nations pursuant to the Act were of a “unique, 
government-to-government nature” and were therefore not as legally 
binding as a “standard government procurement contract[].”111 
Next, the government argued that it was excused from its 
obligations to Cherokee Nation because deficient appropriations had 
left it with insufficient funds to immediately and simultaneously 
satisfy all of its obligations to all of the Indian tribes.  It pointed to a 
contract proviso, stating that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision 
in this subchapter, the provision of funds . . . is [1] subject to the 
availability of appropriations and the Secretary [2] is not required to 
reduce funding [to one] tribe to make funds available to 
another . . . .”112  The Court rejected this argument, however, 
observing that the agency possessed sufficient unrestricted funds to 
satisfy its obligations to Cherokee Nation, even though it may have 
earmarked those funds for other uses.113 
                                                          
 107. See Cherokee Nation of Okla., 543 U.S. at 634-35 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f(a), 
450a(b)). 
 108. Id. at 639. 
 109. Id. at 635 (citing § 450j-1). 
 110. Id. at 631. 
 111. According to the government, if a tribe chooses to “ste[p] into the shoes of a 
federal agency, the law should treat it like an agency; and an agency enjoys no legal 
entitlement to receive promised amounts from Congress.”  Id. at 638 (internal 
quotations omitted).  The Court explained that the Act characterized such 
agreements as not being procurement contracts solely to circumvent formal 
procurement burdens and not to imply that they were not legally binding.  See id. at 
640. 
 112. Id. at 640-41 (quoting § 450j-1(b)). 
 113. Id. at 641. 
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b. Motions practice 
The other non-patent case to which the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in its last two terms was Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich, 
Inc.,114 a case involving pre-verdict motions.115  The respondent in that 
case had filed a Rule 50(a) motion for (pre-verdict) judgment as a 
matter of law but had failed to renew the motion after the verdict, 
pursuant to Rule 50(b).116 
The Federal Circuit was bound to apply Tenth Circuit law, under 
which a failure to file a post-verdict motion did not prevent a party 
from appealing the sufficiency of the evidence as long as it had 
properly filed a pre-verdict motion.117  A failure to file a post-verdict 
motion did, however, bar an outright reversal on appeal, so that a 
new trial was the only potentially-available remedy.118  Finding the 
evidence to be insufficient to support the verdict, the Federal Circuit 
therefore remanded the case for a new trial.119  The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that where a party fails to file a post-verdict (Rule 
50(b)) motion, appellate courts lack the authority to consider the 
sufficiency of the evidence.120 
2. Recent patent cases 
In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,121 decided June 13, 2005, the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that the “safe harbor” provisions of 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) permit the use of patented compounds in 
preclinical studies, where the studies are reasonably expected to 
produce information relevant to filing for FDA approval.122  Section 
271(e)(1) provides an experimental use and testing exemption that is 
applicable when use of the patented compound is “reasonably related 
to the development and submission of information under a Federal 
law which regulates the . . . use . . . of drugs.”123  The issue in Merck was 
how broadly to construe this safe harbor provision.124  The patentee, 
Integra, had argued that it should not protect Merck’s otherwise 
                                                          
 114. 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006), rev’g 375 F.3d 1341, 1365, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 115. Id. at 988. 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)-(b). 
 117. Unitherm Food Sys. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1365, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705, 1723 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 118. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723. 
 119. Id. at 1366-67, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724. 
 120. Unitherm Food Sys., 126 S. Ct. at 988. 
 121. 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005), vacating 331 F.3d 860, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 122. Id. at 2376. 
 123. 35 U.S.C.A. § 27(e)(1) (2003). 
 124. Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2376. 
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infringing activities because not all of Merck’s experiments had 
culminated in its seeking regulatory approval for a product.125 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Integra, holding that the statute 
applied to the use of patented compounds only in late-stage, and not 
in early-stage, drug development.126  It reached its decision by 
considering the goal of § 271(e)(1), namely to “facilitat[e] expedited 
approval of patented pioneer drugs already on the market.”127  The 
Federal Circuit opined that: 
Extending § 271(e)(1) to embrace all aspects of new drug 
development activities would ignore its language and context with 
respect to the 1984 Act in an attempt to exonerate infringing uses 
only potentially related to information for FDA approval.  
Moreover, such an extension would not confine the scope of 
§ 271(e)(1) to de minimis encroachment on the rights of the 
patentee.  For example, expansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the 
Scripps-Merck activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights 
of patentees owning biotechnology tool patents.128 
The Supreme Court reversed: 
We decline to read the “reasonable relation” requirement so 
narrowly as to render § 271(e)(1)’s stated protection of activities 
leading to FDA approval for all drugs illusory.  Properly construed, 
§ 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for experimentation and failure 
on the road to regulatory approval:  At least where a drugmaker 
has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may 
work, through a particular biological process, to produce a 
particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research 
that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission 
to the FDA, that use is “reasonably related” to the “development 
and submission of information under . . . Federal law.”129 
It will be interesting to see the impact of the Supreme Court’s broad 
reading of § 271(e)(1). 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 2381. 
 126. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ( 
The focus of the entire exemption is the provision of information to the 
FDA.  Activities that do not directly produce information for the FDA are 
already straining the relationship to the central purpose of the safe harbor.  
The term “reasonably” permits some activities that are not themselves the 
experiments that produce FDA information to qualify as “solely for uses 
reasonably related” to clinical tests for the FDA. 
). 
 127. Id. at 867, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 128. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 129. Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2383. 
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The most recent patent case decided by the Supreme Court was 
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,130 a case involving issues 
of patent misuse and antitrust law.131  A subsidiary of Illinois Tool 
Works had required purchasers of its patented printheads to also buy 
its unpatented ink.132  The subsidiary’s competitor, Independent Ink, 
alleged that this tying arrangement constituted an antitrust 
violation.133  The district court found for Illinois Tool Works, on the 
grounds that Independent Ink had failed to demonstrate that the 
tying arrangement had enabled the printhead patentee to raise ink 
prices above the prevailing market rate.134 
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that patents are presumed to 
convey market power, and the defendant bears the burden of proving 
otherwise.135  In so doing it needed to parse several apparently 
contradictory Supreme Court opinions on the subject.  First, the 
appeals court observed that “[e]arlier Supreme Court cases dealing 
with tying agreements were extremely hostile to them, whether the 
case involved intellectual property or other tying products.”136  
Second, it acknowledged that later Supreme Court cases, which do 
not involve statutory intellectual property, did require a showing of 
market power.137  Ultimately, however, the Federal Circuit decided 
the case based on the Supreme Court’s intellectual property tying 
cases—precedent that had never been overruled: 
In sum, the Supreme Court cases in this area squarely establish that 
patent and copyright tying, unlike other tying cases, do not require 
an affirmative demonstration of market power. Rather, International 
Salt and Loew’s make clear that the necessary market power to 
establish a section 1 violation [of the Sherman Act] is presumed. 
The continued validity of International Salt and Loew’s as binding 
authority, and the distinction between patent tying and other tying 
cases that was articulated in Loew’s, have been consistently 
reaffirmed by the Court ever since. 138 
                                                          
 130. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006), vacating 396 F.3d 1342, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 131. Id. at 1284. 
 132. Id. at 1285. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344-45, 73 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 135. Id. at 1348-49, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 136. Id. at 1346, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949); 
Int’l Salt Co. v United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)). 
 137. See id. at 1347, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977)). 
 138. Id. at 1348-49, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (citing United States v. Loew’s, 
Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Int’l Salt Co., 332 U.S. 392). 
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The Federal Circuit acknowledged the heavy academic criticism of 
those early cases, but it explained that it was bound to apply them, as 
“it is the duty of a court of appeals to follow the precedents of the 
Supreme Court until the Court itself chooses to expressly overrule 
them.”139 
The Supreme granted certiorari, noting in its opinion the 
principled analysis of the Federal Circuit, and explaining that it 
“granted certiorari to undertake a fresh examination of the history of 
both the judicial and legislative appraisals of tying arrangements.”140  
The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the judgment of the Federal 
Circuit, concluding that: 
Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists 
have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily 
confer market power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same 
conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all cases involving a tying 
arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has 
market power in the tying product.141 
3. Patent cases pending before the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court recently heard two patent cases in which it had 
granted certiorari to this Circuit.  They are Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings,142 argued March 21, 2006, 
and MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,143 argued March 29, 2006. As of 
this writing, neither of these cases has been decided. 
In Metabolite Labs, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine: 
[w]hether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, 
undescribed, and non-enabling step directing a party simply to 
“correlat[e]” test results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic 
scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that any 
doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about 
the relationship after looking at a test result.144 
The case involved the construction of a claim to: 
[a] method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in 
warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of:  [1] assaying a body 
                                                          
 139. Id. at 1351, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 140. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1285 (2006). 
 141. Id. 
 142. 70 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. 
Ct. 601 (2005) (mem.). 
 143. 401 F.3d 1323, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 
S. Ct. 733 (2005) (mem.). 
 144. Brief of Petitioner at i, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (mem.) (No. 04-607). 
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fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and 
[2] correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body 
fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.145 
The Federal Circuit adopted the district court’s construction of the 
word “correlating” to mean “to establish a mutual or reciprocal 
relationship between.”146  The Supreme Court will probably need to 
determine whether a correlation between two observed natural 
phenomena can qualify for patent protection, or whether such 
subject matter is unpatentable. 
In MercExchange, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine 
“[w]hether th[e] Court should reconsider its precedents, including 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,147 on when it is 
appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent infringer.”148  In 
that case, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of 
MercExchange’s motion for a permanent injunction against 
infringement of its patents.149  The Federal Circuit explained that the 
routine grant of such injunctions was “longstanding practice”150 and 
that it could “see no reason to depart from the general rule that 
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement 
absent exceptional circumstances.”151  The Supreme Court’s decision 
may help to shape the extent to which patents continue to be viewed 
as property rights, against the invasion of which injunctive relief is 
routinely available, as opposed to as contracts, the breach of which 
leads to mere damages.  Deeply embedded in this case is the 
underlying issue of the extent to which patent incentives and/or 
economic efficiency will be served by adhering to one remedial 
regime, the other, or possibly by blending both. 
                                                          
 145. See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-
59, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. Patent No. 
4,940,658, col.11 l.58-65 (filed Nov. 20, 1986)). 
 146. Id. at 1361, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 147. 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
 148. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) (mem.) (citing 
Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405). 
 149. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1336, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 150. See id. at 1338, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237 (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki 
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) 
(“Because the ‘right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the 
concept of property,’ the general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once 
infringement and validity have been adjudged.”). 
 151. Id. at 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. 
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II. ARE WE BECOMING THE “NINTH CIRCUIT” OF THE                          
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 
The role of the Federal Circuit has always been, of course, 
somewhat unique.  As a national appeals court for various areas of the 
law, it has served to promote uniformity, principally in patent law, as 
had been the goal of Congress.  One might imagine that the 
existence of a national intermediate appellate tribunal would, in 
several ways, reduce the incentive for the Supreme Court to hear 
patent cases.  For example, circuit splits involving the Federal Circuit 
have traditionally been rare in patent cases,152 given that the Federal 
Circuit is by far the principal expounder of the patent law.153  Because 
circuit splits draw attention to unsettled areas of the law, we might 
expect a lower rate of review of this court’s judgments than those of 
the regional circuits.154 
Of course, even in the absence of a circuit split, the Supreme 
Court’s attention might be drawn to a case in which Federal Circuit 
judges express sharply diverging views on a particular issue.155  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court might still be relatively less likely to 
grant certiorari, at least to the extent that the social and economic 
costs of a substantively “wrong” Federal Circuit decision are not 
accompanied by costs attendant to a lack of national uniformity per 
se.156  Similarly, one might speculate that the Supreme Court might 
                                                          
 152. Note, however, that in Festo the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a 
split between the patent law of the Federal Circuit and that expounded by two 
regional circuits before the Federal Circuit came into existence.  See supra note 53 
and accompanying text. 
 153. We say “principal,” rather than “sole” expounder, because our patent 
jurisdiction has never been entirely exclusive of that of the Circuit Courts.  See, e.g., 
Christianson III, 822 F.2d 1544, 1551, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 
1987).  In addition, because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Vornado, there is 
likely to be a significant increase in the number of patent appeals heard in the 
regional circuits.  See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Helen Wilson Nies, Dissents at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Review, 
45 AM. U. L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1996) ( 
These ‘intercircuit conflicts’ are a frequent trigger for Supreme Court 
review.  When the Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve an intercircuit 
conflict, the Court has the benefit of a thoughtful discourse on the conflict 
in majority opinions.  In the areas in which this court exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction, this traditional type of intercircuit debate cannot arise. 
). 
 155. See, e.g., id. 
 156. Conversely, the absence of these “non-uniformity” costs may be more than 
offset by the fact that the “substantive” costs of a “wrong” decision are felt across the 
entire country, and not in just one region thereof.  See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. 
Morton Int’l, 508 U.S. 83, 89 (1993) (“Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from all United States District Courts in patent litigation, 
the rule that it applied in this case, and has been applying regularly . . . is a matter of 
special importance to the entire Nation.  We therefore granted certiorari.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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be somewhat more likely to presume the substantive correctness of 
judgments of a circuit court that is “expert” in a particular area of 
specialization.157 
There appears to have been a recent increase, however, in the 
frequency of Supreme Court review of our decisions, and the 
explanation for this is not clear.  Perhaps the Federal Circuit is, after 
almost a quarter of a century, reaching the end of its “honeymoon 
period.”158  Perhaps the Supreme Court is simply responding to the 
ever-increasing importance of intellectual property rights by more 
carefully scrutinizing the substantive patent law, as expounded by the 
Federal Circuit.  Perhaps the Supreme Court perceives that there is 
more disagreement among the judges on this Circuit than there was 
in the earlier years of this court.159  Although only time will tell, 
                                                          
 157. It is not at all clear, however, that this has been the case, particularly not 
recently.  See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 737-38 (2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit had adopted the flexible-bar rule 
“[b]ased upon its experience” but disagreeing with its decision for reasons that 
included, inter alia, “respect[] of the real practice before the PTO”). 
 158. Former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, Howard T. Markey, once referred to the Federal Circuit, in its early years, as 
“the probable court of last resort in most of its cases.”  Howard T. Markey, The Federal 
Circuit and Congressional Intent, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 303, 304 (1992). 
Similarly, while Congress was debating the creation of the Federal Circuit “former-
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold [had] predicted that ‘the Supreme Court would 
rarely exercise its discretion to review these decisions, since there would be no 
conflicts, and most of the questions decided . . . would not be worthy of Supreme 
Court review.’”  Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 570 (2003) (quoting the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1979:  Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 48 (1979) 
(statement of Erwin Griswold, former-Solicitor General)). 
 159. In characterizing the early years of our court, former Chief Judge Markey 
wrote that: 
[t]he Federal Circuit . . . recognized at the outset that assurance of reliability 
required the maintenance of a maximum level of uniformity among its own 
statements of the law.  Simply put, a court created to reduce existing 
conflicts would fail in its mission if its opinion were to create new 
jurisprudential conflicts. 
Markey, supra note 158, at 303-04. 
However, in 1996, former Chief Judge Nies suggested that judges’ strong 
dissenting views in several cases—In re Lockwood, Markman, and Warner-Jenkinson—had 
contributed to their review by the Supreme Court and that dissents were beneficial 
because they spurred the Supreme Court to settle “intra-circuit” splits that would 
otherwise be prone to ineffective resolution through rehearings en banc.  See Nies, 
supra note 154, at 1519-20 (explaining that “[j]udges disputing a point more likely 
will pique the Court’s interest than lawyers disputing a point”).  Id. at 1520.  For 
example, in Festo, the Supreme Court noted: 
In four separate opinions, the dissenters argued that the majority’s decision 
to overrule precedent was contrary to Warner-Jenkinson and would unsettle 
the expectations of many existing patentees.  Judge Michel, in his dissent, 
described in detail how the complete bar required the Court of Appeals to 
disregard 8 older decisions of this Court, as well as more than 50 of its own 
cases. 
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perhaps we are witnessing the beginning of what will become a 
comprehensive Supreme Court “reform” of this country’s patent law 
jurisprudence.  If so, we can expect the reversal rate of the Federal 
Circuit to soar.  Quite possibly, the Federal Circuit is poised to 
become the “Ninth Circuit” of the twenty-first century. 
                                                                                                                                      
  We granted certiorari. 
535 U.S. at 730, rev’g 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en 
banc). 
